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Our technique is based on the combination of digital signatures and one time passwords based on hash chains. In this paper, we present a new cryptographic technique to make ARP secure and provide protection against ARP cache poisoning. In fact, there are a number of tools freely available on the internet using which, even a newbie can launch such an attack. Due to lack of the required authentication, any host on the LAN can forge an ARP reply containing malicious IP to MAC address mapping causing ARP cache poisoning. The cause of this problem is the absence of authentication of the mapping between IP addresses and MAC addresses. ARP cache poisoning is a long standing problem which is known to be difficult to solve without compromising efficiency.